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PRODUCING GOVERNABLE SUBJECTS 
Images of Childhood Old and New 
 
Conceptions of childhood in terms of ‘evil’ and ‘innocence’ transcend time and 
culture. These conflicting images are deployed by Chris Jenks as the Dionysian and 
Apollonian models of childhood to symbolize external and internal forms of control. 
Drawing on the literature on governmentality this paper revisits these models and 
introduces a third - the ‘Athenian’ child - loosely analogous and supplementary to 
those developed by Jenks. This model is necessary in order to take account of 
relatively recent  strategies in the government of childhood, which, predicated on 
understandings of children in terms of competence and agency, operate via 
responsibility and reflexivity.  
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Over the last decade or so there has developed a fairly substantial body of literature 
examining strategies for governing childhood associated with contemporary neo-
liberal and ‘advanced liberal’ rationalities of rule (e.g. Fendler, 2001; Kelly, 2000, 
2006; Ailwood, 2004, 2008; Kampmann, 2004; Dahlberg and Moss, 2005). As yet 
there has been little exploration of the relationship between these strategies - premised 
on individual autonomy and responsibility - and more traditional approaches to 
exercising control over the young. Chris Jenks (2005) offers a useful way of thinking 
about childhood and control with his Dionysian (evil) and Apollonian (innocent) 
images of childhood. This article draws on the literature on governmentality in 
revisiting these models and taking inspiration from Jenks presents a new model of 
childhood - the ‘Athenian’ child – as a tool for representing and interrogating 
governmental strategies of ‘responsibilization’. The article begins with a brief 
overview of the concept of governmentality and its relevance to childhood. I then 
examine the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood using the historical 
literature on childhood as well as that on governmentality to build upon and modify 
Jenks’ account. After looking at the emergence of conceptions of childhood in terms 
of competence and agency, I draw on the literature to examine how these ideas have 
been taken up in advanced liberal government of childhood. The model of the 
‘Athenian’ child is then presented and examined.  Finally there is a brief discussion 
on the interconnection between discursive constructions of childhood and relations of 
power from the perspective of the three models. 
 
Governmentality: Producing Governable Subjects  
Governmentality refers to any rational approach to government (Dean, 1999; Rose, 
1999a), conceptualized by Foucault (2007) as the ‘conduct of conduct’. The idea of 
government indicates a mode of exercising power, characteristic of liberalism, which 
in contrast to sovereign power, seeks to shape, rather than foreclose, possibilities for 
human agency. The primary concern of government is the “administration of life” 
(Dean, 1999: 99).  Liberal government represents a form of rule in which the exercise 
of sovereign power has been transformed by mechanisms of power –discipline and 
biopolitics-connected with the administration of life both at the level of individuals 
and populations (Foucault, 2004, 2007, 2008; see also Dean, 1999). 
 
Discipline targets individuals in order to enhance efficiency and obedience (Foucault, 
1977: 170). Central to disciplinary power is the idea of the norm, a common standard 
which operates to individualize the masses through differentiating the ‘normal’ from 
the ‘abnormal’ (Foucault, 1994a: 403-404). Within liberal regimes disciplinary norms 
are for the most part internalized and are largely derived from biopolitical norms. 
Biopolitical norms extracted from population-level statistical data operate to make 
collective behaviour calculable and predictable, rendering the ‘hands-off’ approach of 
liberal government the most efficient means of exercising political power (Dean, 
1999).  
 
Containing inherent limits to the direct control of personal behaviour, liberalism is 
predicated upon the willingness and capacity of autonomous individuals to choose to 
exercise responsible self-government. Therefore, liberal government is primarily a 
matter of fostering responsible, “governable subjects” (Rose, 1999a). Much of this 
effort takes place in homes and schools with children representing the raw material. 
This is not to be understood in a crude way in terms of moulding the young according 
to a predetermined form. At the same time the efforts of parents and educators to 
guide their young charges necessarily engage (however indirectly) with standards of 
‘normal’ childhood shaped by prevailing ontological and epistemological assumptions 
(Jenks, 2005). While the norms governing childhood are these days derived from 
science, rather than religion or philosophy as in the past, they can be regarded neither 
as the product of purely objective inquiry nor neutral in their effects.  
 
Images of Childhood  
While acknowledging variation, Chris Jenks (2005: 62) suggests that two images of 
‘normal’ childhood – the Dionysian and the Apollonian – have a potency that 
transcends time and culture. The Dionysian ‘evil’ child is characterized in terms of 
wildness, wilfulness and sensuality, a view of childhood which in Western culture has 
been shaped by the Christian doctrine of ‘original sin’ (Jenks, 2005: 62-63). The 
Apollonian ‘innocent’ child - the paradigmatic, modern, Western conception of 
childhood – is represented as intrinsically good, even angelic (Jenks, 2005: 64-65). 
Drawing loosely on Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power, Jenks links these two 
images with two contrasting models of social control. The model of child-rearing 
signified by the Dionysian image, whereby adults exercise strict controls over 
children, is associated with a social order - “the old European order” - governed by 
rigid codes of behaviour with little opportunity for individuality (2005:66). Adult 
control over children is backed up by force, if necessary―the act of physically 
chastising the recalcitrant child serving as an affirmation of collective values (2005: 
70). By contrast, the Apollonian image is linked to a social order - “the new order of 
modern industrial society” - in which an emphasis on shared values is displaced by a 
premium on individuality (2005:66). Exercising control over children is to be 
achieved not through domination, but through “child-centred” approaches in which 
the child is accorded the freedom to develop his/her own interests and talents (Jenks, 
2005: 65).  
 
The Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood provide useful tools for 
conceptualizing the links between constructions of childhood and child-rearing and 
wider patterns of social relations, however the danger of using models of childhood in 
this way is that complexity and contingency may be sacrificed for a cohesive 
narrative. In particular, Jenks’ account risks reifying two distinct ‘social orders’ - the 
pre-liberal/authoritarian order of pre-modern Europe and the liberal capitalist order of 
modern industrial societies - characterized by conceptions of childhood and practices 
of child-rearing which stand in direct opposition to each other. Although Jenks 
acknowledges that the Dionysian and Apollonian images have been deployed within 
the same time periods, his emphasis on ‘social orders’ tends to elide the wide 
variation in both strategies of control and constructions of childhood (for example by 
class or gender) at various points in time, as well as the significant differences to be 
found in individual child-rearing practices. Arguably an analogous criticism could be 
leveled at Foucault’s analysis of discipline (somewhat modified in Foucault’s later 
work on governmentality), however a key point of differentiation is that Jenks’ 
account of childhood and control appears to be grounded in divergent social structures 
rather than the close scrutiny of the inter- relationship between knowledge and power 
which is the hallmark of a Foucauldian/governmentality approach. 
 
Viewed from the vantage of governmentality the Dionysian and Apollonian images 
can be regarded as symbolic targets of specific configurations of power/knowledge. 
These correspond to the disciplinary techniques which emerged in the early modern 
period and the subsequent transformation of discipline associated with the emergence 
of biopolitical power in the eighteenth century (Foucault, 2004; 2007). The rise of 
discipline is associated with the idea of the “malleable humanist subject” (Chen, 
2005: 12) which serves as both condition and end of disciplinary modes of control 
(Foucault, 1977: 170). In early modern Europe the humanist subject was to be 
regulated via external precepts derived from religion or philosophy.  Statistical and 
scientific advances from the eighteenth century facilitated new ways of 
conceptualizing the objects and subjects of government (Rose, 1999a).  This made 
possible the idea of the ‘population’ as “a quasi-natural reality” subject to its own 
laws and processes (Foucault, 2004: 245-247). It also provided new means of 
conceptualizing and managing individuals on the basis of scientific norms (Rose, 
1999a), derived in a sense from the ‘nature’ of man (Dean, 1999). These shifting 
conceptions of governable subjects are reflected in the discursive constitution of the 
Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood in the prescriptions of pedagogues 
and child-rearing experts.  
 
Although described by Jenks as “competitive to the point of absolute incompatibility” 
(2005: 62) the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood share common 
discursive elements. As manifest in Western culture via Christianity the distinction 
between these images is not so much between innocence and evil, as between innate 
innocence versus acquired innocence. In early Christianity sinfulness was transmitted 
through generation, but absolved through baptism. Thus as Gittins (1998: 146) writes, 
innocence was acquired through external means, with active parental intercession 
required to preserve innocence as children developed (Nelson, 1994: 86). Following 
the Protestant Reformation the acquisition of innocence through baptism was no 
longer a possibility for non-Catholics, increasing the importance of the parental role 
in producing virtuous souls.  It is therefore unsurprising that there is a noticeable 
increase in the volume of child-rearing and pedagogical literature in the early modern 
period (Aries, 1962; Foucault, 2007). This development Ariès (1962) regards as 
indicating the demarcation of childhood as a separate sphere, however, as yet, the 
primary focus of moral and educational concern was upper class boys. 
 
The leitmotif of early modern childrearing literature, whether of Catholic or Protestant 
origin, was obedience (Fletcher, 1994; Logan, 1994). The patriarchal family was at its 
zenith at this time, mirroring the centralization of political control in the age of 
absolutism (Jenks, 2005: 147). The prevailing pessimistic understanding of human 
nature necessitated firm controls in the interest of order. This view was most 
systematically delineated in Hobbes Leviathan regarded by Jenks as “the 
philosophical antecedent for the evil child” (2005: 146). While rejecting the idea of an 
intrinsically wicked human nature, Hobbes understood virtue as socially produced – 
via discipline – rather than innate (Burchell, 1999: 509-510). This emphasis on human 
nature as formed rather than revealed reflects the conceptual shift towards humanist 
conceptions of selfhood in the early modern period (Niestroj-Kutzner, 1996; Chen, 
2005), evident in the deployment of horticultural metaphors in contemporary child-
rearing literature (Logan, 1994; Cunningham, 1995). The ancient theme of childhood 
innocence acquired a particular potency when combined with the humanist emphasis 
on perfectibility – the malleability of the child offers the opportunity to manipulate 
the future, something which became increasingly important with the gradual 
development of the modern state (Rose, 1999b). Childhood innocence, whether 
understood as innate or acquired, thus becomes re-conceptualized as the ‘blank slate’ 
upon which the future can be written.  
 
The Dionysian notion of acquired innocence resonates with modes of socialization in 
which virtuous habits must be inculcated through external discipline. The innate 
innocence symbolized by the Apollonian child indicates an alternative form of 
socialization, grounded in subtler modes of manipulation, by which children are 
allowed to develop ‘naturally’. This approach came to prominence with the 
publication of Rousseau’s Émile, which according to Jenks (2005: 65) represents the 
formalization of the Apollonian child. Containing the groundbreaking assertion that 
children are inherently virtuous, Émile reflects the more positive valuation of human 
nature which underpinned demands for popular sovereignty. Rousseau was unique in 
the strong emphasis he placed on the special nature of childhood; he urged that 
children be treated as children, a significant departure from prevailing practices. At 
the same time Émile belongs to a pedagogical tradition in which childhood was 
viewed in classed and gendered terms. It was not until Rousseau’s ideas were taken 
up via the Victorian Romantic movement that ‘Apollonian’ conceptions of childhood 
were deployed in relation to the entire child population (Cunningham, 1995). 
 
The rise of the Apollonian child was gradual and uneven, reflecting competing claims 
to knowledge as well as varying patterns of control by gender and especially social 
class. While the nineteenth century stands out as the period when huge efforts were 
made to extend ‘childhood’ to the masses, working-class children were generally 
positioned as the Dionysian ‘other’ to the innocent middle-class child. Far from being 
‘child-centred’ measures such as compulsory education seemed designed to contain 
the threat posed by the inadequately socialized children of the poor (Hendrick, 1997) 
and were grounded in the assumption that working-class parents were as yet unfit to 
assume the burdens of self-government (Rose, 1999b). As regards the child-rearing 
norms that governed parental behaviour generally, the influence of Romantic 
conceptions of childhood was tempered by Evangelical insistence on the venality of 
the young (Hendrick, 1997).  
 
The nineteenth century liberal subject was a moral subject; the product of 
socialization was character, to be produced via external intervention through a dual 
process of disciplining body and mind (White and Hunt, 2000: 104). A task 
accomplished primarily in childhood, character development depended upon methods 
of socialization designed to promote moral well-being. The aim was to liberate the 
individual from ‘slavery’ to the senses by subjugating the ‘lower passions’ to the will 
(Valverde, 1996). From the turn of the twentieth century subjectivity came to be 
understood more in terms of personality. This shift, associated with internal forms of 
control (White and Hunt, 2000), was grounded in self-conscious attempts within the 
field of psychology to move towards a more ‘modern’ scientific conception of self-
hood (Heinze, 2003). The impact on childhood was profound as biopolitical norms 
extrapolated from statistical data on the ‘nature’ of childhood increasingly provided 
the prism through which children were perceived (Rose, 1999b). Concern with 
children’s moral welfare was subsumed under the growing emphasis on psychological 
development. This was associated with a gentler mode of self-formation and increased 
appreciation of the maternal role, reinforced by the centrality of ‘attachment’ to 
developmental psychology in the period following the Second World War. The rise of 
welfarist rationalities at this time went hand in hand with a growing optimism that 
state intervention informed by scientific expertise could promote a healthy, ‘well-
adjusted’ society by supporting the production of healthy, well-adjusted selves (Rose, 
1998; 1999b). ‘Investment’ in childhood – the future - was an important aspect of the 
post-war welfare state (Cunningham, 1995; Rose, 1999b), stimulating development of 
the panoply of child-centred policies, programmes and practices associated with the 
Apollonian image of childhood.  
 
Re-thinking Childhood  
Whether conceptualized as innate or acquired the concept of innocence has for 
centuries shaped understandings of childhood. In recent decades the image of the 
innocent child has been subject to critical scrutiny, in particular from scholars within 
the ‘new’ social studies of childhood as well as advocates of children’s rights. Their 
arguments are too familiar to require much elaboration here, but centre on the 
underestimation of children’s abilities and restriction of their role in society as well as 
the negative consequences for children who have not conformed to the innocent ideal 
(Corteen and Scraton, 1997; Kitzinger, 1997; Meyer, 2007). These arguments form 
part of a broader attempt to ‘de-naturalize’ childhood by challenging the biological 
determinism of popular and scientific - in particular psychological - thought 
(Holloway and Valentine, 2000: 4-5). Efforts to enhance the status of children have 
been supported by the relatively novel conception of children as ‘competent social 
actors’. This ‘strong’ rather than ‘weak’ image of childhood is an increasingly 
important point of reference in theory, policy and practice, underpinning moves to 
promote children’s inclusion as participants in society rather than ‘apprentice adults’ 
(Alanen, 1998; Roche, 1999; Mayall, 2000).  
 
The rise of the ‘participative child’ is evident in the public sphere of law and politics – 
facilitated by the right to participate in decision making accorded by Article 12 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child - but also in the private domains of families 
and schools. Child-rearing and education appear more ‘democratic’, based much more 
on open communication and negotiation than in the past (Cunningham, 1995; Beck, 
1998; Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie, 2006). It has been suggested that this 
quite profound shift in child-adult relations is linked to changes in adulthood as well 
as childhood. For instance, Lee (2000: 7-8) writes that in an era defined by permanent 
flux, it is not just that children are no longer ‘incomplete adults’, adulthood has been 
divested of the mantle of completeness. In a similar vein Beck has suggested that the 
disappearance of “goals or certainties that must be ‘inoculated into’ young people” 
means that the transition to adulthood “is now possible only through ‘self-
socialization’” (1998: 163). As with Lee, Beck’s explanation for this shift focuses on 
broad social, economic and cultural changes, but the picture is a little different from a 
governmentality perspective. From this vantage the ‘self-socializing’ child appears as 
a form of ‘governable child subject’ constituted via strategies which aim to draw upon 
children’s (newly recognized) capacities for self-regulation. 
 
Childhood and Advanced Liberal Government  
Scholars working within a governmentality framework see strong parallels between 
the rise of the ‘competent child’ and the significance placed on such values as 
responsibility and self-reliance within what Rose (1999a) terms ‘advanced liberal’ 
approaches to government. Advanced liberalism does not refer to a single rationality 
but is intended to signify 
 
...the broader realm of the various assemblages of rationalities, technologies 
and agencies that make up the characteristic ways of governing in advanced 
liberal democracies.  
(Dean, 1999: 149-150)  
 
Central to advanced liberal rule are the neo-liberal concepts of ‘competition’, ‘choice’ 
and ‘enterprise’ which permeate contemporary strategies for ‘conducting conduct’ 
(Rose, 1999a: 141-142). Within advanced liberal regimes risks which were once 
deemed social now accrue to individuals (Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie, 2006: 
136); in order to manage individual risk the advanced liberal subject or 
‘entrepreneurial self’ (Foucault, 2008) is urged to adopt a life-long project of 
investment in personal ‘human capital’. As Vandebroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie 
caution, we cannot “draw a straight line” between changing conceptions of childhood 
and neo-liberal policy (2006: 140). At the same time evidence from research suggests 
that ideas about children’s competence and agency have been taken up – for example 
in early years curricula (Ailwood, 2004, 2008; Graham, 2007) “student voice” 
initiatives (Bragg, 2007) and even in the design of infant toys (Nadesan, 2002) - in 
ways which resonate strongly with the idea of the self-maximizing, entrepreneurial 
subject of neo-liberal and advanced liberal thought.  
 
Contemporary child-rearing and educational norms may be more ‘democratic’ than in 
the past, but they are linked to forms of knowledge and expertise which view 
children’s agency in instrumental terms (Fendler, 2001; Dahlberg and Moss 2005). 
Looking at developmental psychology, which remains a privileged source of 
knowledge, we find in recent years much greater recognition of the social context of 
development as well as the active role of children in the developmental process 
(Hogan, 2005: 34). Here the idea of the participative child is associated with the 
extension of the psychological gaze into the inter-personal and intra-personal aspects 
of children’s worlds (Fendler, 2001). The manner in which children relate to others 
and to themselves is thereby opened up for measurement and management. When 
translated into pedagogical theory and practice the newly constituted agentive subject 
of developmental discourse lends itself to novel forms of conducting conduct aimed at 
inculcating the ability to monitor and adjust desires, attitudes and behaviour in line 
with educational goals (Fendler, 2001: 121-122). This emphasis on reflexivity 
represents a shift by which, like adult ‘life-long’ learners, “children are not only 
obliged to shape their own learning, but also to take responsibility for this shaping” 
(Kryger, 2004: 154-155). Child educational subjects are thereby positioned as 
“autonomous choosers” (Marshall, 1996), which serves to problematize young people 
who do not “choose” appropriately (Graham, 2007) re-inscribing disadvantage as a 
personal or familial failing. 
 
The individualization of risk, characteristic of advanced liberal government, is 
reflected in the expansion in the number of programmes and initiatives, formal and 
informal, by which children and young people (and usually their parents) are called 
upon to assume responsibility for risk management by modifying their own attitudes 
and behaviour (Kelly, 2000, 468-469). This is apparent, in relation to the ‘fight’ 
against obesity (Share and Strain, 2008), and in efforts to reduce alcohol/substance 
abuse or promote ‘safe’ sexual practices (Shoveller and Johnson, 2006; Schee and 
Baez, 2009). Within these kinds of strategies the idea of child or youth ‘participation’ 
is deployed more as a tool for constituting particular kinds of selves - ‘prudential 
subjects’ (O’Malley, 1996) – than promoting a broader role for children in society. 
Indeed, going hand in hand with these strategies of “responsibilization” has been the 
development of new forms of surveillance and regulation of youth which have been 
extended to encompass a much wider proportion of the ‘non-adult’ population (Kelly, 
2000: 468). 
 
The Athenian Child  
Cultivating the qualities necessary for success in advanced liberal regimes requires a 
mode of socialization significantly different from the models of child-rearing 
symbolized by either the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood. The 
Dionysian child denotes an approach to child-rearing aimed at producing what White 
and Hunt (2000:103) describe as an “upright” moral subject; there is a strong 
emphasis on the moral welfare of children and the paternal role is prioritized. The 
Apollonian child represents a ‘child-centred’ form of socialization more concerned 
with producing unique, but ‘well-adjusted’, individual subjects; the psychological 
welfare of the individual child is central, associated with a stronger emphasis on the 
maternal role. Analogous to the Dionysian and Apollonian models of childhood the 
‘Athenian’ child is presented in this paper as a symbolic target for the relatively novel 
governmental mode of regulating children via strategies of participation and 
‘responsibilization’. Named for the Greek goddess of wisdom (Minerva in Roman 
mythology), the Athenian child is associated with child-rearing norms in which 
welfare is closely associated with autonomy, so that the child is in a sense a ‘partner’ 
in the socialization process. Daughter of Zeus, Athena emerged from her father’s 
forehead fully grown - she is thus the perfect representative of the (partially) self-
governing ‘competent child-actor’.  
 
While the Athenian child represents a break with older constructions of childhood, 
she is nevertheless both produced out of and in relation to the Apollonian child. The 
innately virtuous Apollonian child was constituted from an emancipatory discourse 
which challenged the restrictive ‘Dionysian’ child-rearing model, instead advocating a 
form of ‘restricted liberty’, to use Rousseau’s terms. Children were to be raised apart 
from adult society in a natural setting through methods that sought to develop the 
child’s ability to self-govern, while under discreet, but continual, adult surveillance. 
In this sense, Jenks suggests that the Apollonian child was to be “seen and not heard” 
(2005: 69). The Athenian child is similarly produced from emancipatory discourses, 
which at the same time represent novel means of ‘conducting conduct’, this time 
predicated on children’s ‘voice’ and ‘choice’ and their (qualified) participation in, 
rather than complete separation from the adult world.   
 
The idea of the competent, participative child opens up new opportunities for children 
while simultaneously facilitating forms of control which place potentially onerous 
responsibilities upon the young (Kampmann, 2004: 129-130). This apparently 
contradictory interconnection between freedom and control brings us to the heart of 
the idea of governmentality. From the perspective of governmentality it is not just that 
government operates through freedom, but that individual freedom is itself a form of 
control – sovereignty over the self (Rose, 1999a). Traditionally children were not free 
in this sense; indeed the extension of freedom (in the sense of citizenship rights) to the 
mass of the adult population in Western states is associated with increasing external 
regulation of childhood. Children’s ‘rights’ were understood in a narrow sense in 
terms of restrictions on parental sovereignty designed to ensure compliance with 
child-rearing norms. Acceptance of a broader understanding of children’s rights over 
the last few decades is associated with changing conceptions of freedom and related 
to this, changing conceptions of the kinds of selves to be governed (Rose, 1999a).  
 
The central insight from the governmentality literature is that subjectivity – the 
relationship of the individual to the self – is constituted via the multifarious forms of 
knowledge and expertise deployed in practices of government. In this regard Rose 
(1999a: 84-93) identifies the interrelated domains of consumption and 
“psychotherapeutics” as crucial in providing the conceptual resources by which we 
have come to relate to and regulate ourselves in advanced liberal regimes. Central to 
Rose’s argument is the intersection between pop-psychology ideas around individual 
fulfillment and ‘self-actualization’ and consumerist notions of ‘lifestyle choice’, a 
concept which he suggests has spread out from the domain of purchasable goods to 
infiltrate the most intimate spheres of human existence (Rose, 1999a: 86). According 
to Rose (1998; 1999a) the resulting “regime of the self” has led to freedom becoming 
more closely associated with individual autonomy, narrowly understood as the ‘right 
to choose’. This is a right increasingly accorded to children.  
 
Cook’s work demonstrates that the interaction of psychological expertise and 
marketing strategies has been of huge importance in constituting the child as an 
autonomous ‘choosing subject’. Indeed Cook suggests that “children’s participation in 
the world of goods as actors, as persons with desire, underpins their current emergent 
status as rights-bearing individuals” (2004:12). Representations of agentive childhood 
in advertising and the media call upon adults – including parents, educators and 
policy-makers – to relate to children in particular ways and provide important 
resources through which children come to relate to themselves. This kind of fluid 
discursive diffusion - what Rose terms ‘translation’ - between the kinds of knowledge 
and expertise which individuals draw upon to govern themselves and the forms of 
rationality deployed in political strategies of rule is “what makes government 
possible” (Rose, 1999a: 47).  
 
Rose has written that an important factor in the durability and adaptability of the neo-
liberal discourse of enterprise is its deep resonance with the psycho-consumerist 
emphasis on ‘self-actualization through choice’ (Rose, 1999a: 165-166). In shifting 
responsibility for success or failure from society to the individual, neo-liberal and 
advanced liberal rationalities of rule create the need for reflexive, adaptable, 
‘enterprising’ subjects equipped with the capacity to actively work upon themselves. 
While this is associated with ‘flexible’ forms of socialization, as Fendler (2001: 137) 
suggests, the end goal – the production of “flexible souls”   – is fixed and can be 
viewed in the context of a concept of success defined in restrictive economic terms. 
Kelly has made this point well:   
 
It is not that ‘initiative’, ‘enterprise’, ‘responsibility’ or ‘activity’ are not 
worthwhile human capacities. ... Rather, it is that within the frame of an 
entrepreneurial Selfhood, as it is imagined at the turn of the second 
millennium CE, ‘initiative’, ‘enterprise’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘activity’ are 
narrowly imagined in relation to the performance of exchange relations in the 
extended order of capitalist markets/of all sorts … and we must all assume an 
entrepreneurial disposition to this life form. We fail to do so at our own risk. 
 (2006: 28-29) 
 
The risks of success or failure in advanced liberal regimes are far from evenly 
distributed and the government of childhood must be viewed in the context of wider 
patterns of inequality. Norms such as negotiation and participation, from which the 
Athenian child is produced, have been described as “white, western middle-class, 
norm(s)” by Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie (2006: 138), who caution that 
parents as well as children are regulated via norms of socialization. They find a high 
degree of continuity over time in the way in which child-rearing norms privilege some 
children and parents while marginalizing others. While approaches have varied, a 
persistent theme shaping the government of childhood over the last two centuries is 
the inability of working-class parents to adequately socialize their children. Rose 
(1999b) describes how the moralizing strategies of Victorian philanthropists gave way 
in the twentieth century to the normalizing strategies of scientific expertise in 
educating the mass of parents in the ‘correct’ way to raise their children. Although 
drawing on different conceptions of childhood these strategies are linked by a 
common emphasis on ‘investing in the future’ (Hendrick, 2003: 15-16).  
 
Within the discourse of investment the dichotomous position of the working-class 
child as simultaneously both “victim and threat” means that intervention in the lives 
of working-class families has been viewed primarily as a means of reducing future 
expenditure on welfare provision and prisons (Hendrick, 2003). Investing in the future 
remains an important aim of contemporary ‘advanced liberal’ government of 
childhood, but with the twist that children themselves are offered an active role in the 
development of individual human capital. At the same time, alternative tutelary, 
exclusionary or coercive strategies may still be utilized for those young people and 
their families deemed unwilling or unable to prioritize long-term goals over short-
term gains. Hence we can say that the Athenian child supplements rather than 
supplants earlier modes of conceptualizing/regulating childhood. As Meyer writes, 
“the discourse of evil persists and the discourse of rights has not displaced the 
discourse of innocence or gained the status of supremacy” (2007: 87). Across policy 
domains – in particular child protection and youth justice (Meyer, 2007) - child 
subjects may yet be constituted in Dionysian or Apollonian terms in strategies which 
can vary, according to age, gender, class or ethnicity.   
 
While they remain important elements of popular and political discourse, it is 
important to emphasize that the Dionysian and Apollonian images of childhood may 
be reconfigured within contemporary rationalities of rule via ‘Athenian’ strategies of 
responsibilization. For instance, the innocent, vulnerable child typical of child welfare 
discourse has in recent years been expected to shoulder some of the burden of 
protection. An example of this form of strategy is the kind of ‘stay safe’ programme 
designed to enable children to recognize and respond to potentially dangerous 
situations. While this can bring benefits in terms of increased knowledge and self-
confidence, Kitzinger (1997: 179-184) notes some potential dangers of placing 
responsibility on children in this way. One concern is that the risk of violence against 
children who resist their abusers could be increased. There is also the possibility of 
stimulating feelings of guilt in children who do not resist abuse. More importantly, 
such programmes are limited in their potential to challenge the unequal power 
relations through which children’s vulnerability is produced in the first place 
(Kitzinger, 1997). 
 
In a similar fashion, when measured against the Athenian ideal, the ‘evil’ child of 
criminal justice discourse may be subject to forms of intervention, which seek to 
make her not innocent as in the past, but responsible. A good example is the use of 
restorative justice as a strategy for inculcating a sense of responsibility not only in 
young offenders, but usually in their families as well. While supporting young people 
and their families to reach their own solutions can be seen as a form of 
‘empowerment’, any approach which deals with youth crime primarily in individual 
or familial terms can serve to obscure the wider inequalities in terms of resources and 
opportunities which can lead to some young people becoming involved in criminal 
behaviour.  
 
All of this is not to suggest that child participation is not ‘a good thing’; instead the 
lesson from research on the government of childhood is that “everything is 
dangerous” (Foucault, 1994b: 256). The re-conceptualization of children as competent 
social actors brings potential benefits to children in terms of heightened status and 
increased autonomy, however the salutary lesson from the governmentality literature 
is that these ideas can be taken up in ways which can burden or disadvantage children 
(Kampmann, 2004). Enjoined to become 'responsible choosers', within contemporary 
rationalities of rule children are positioned to a certain extent as self-governing. 
Unfortunately, the promise of autonomy which this entails does not necessarily 
challenge generational inequalities and may serve to stigmatize ‘irresponsible’ 
children and their parents in ways which reinforce the effects of structural inequalities 
(Vandenbroeck and Bouverne-de-Vie, 2006).  
 
Discussion  
The images of childhood presented in this paper – the Dionysian and Apollonian 
models developed by Chris Jenks, supplemented by the ‘Athenian’ model of 
childhood introduced above do not represent the totality of ways of conceptualizing 
and regulating childhood in the early twenty-first century. They do, however, serve as 
a useful framework for examining the links between discursive constructions of 
childhood and relations of power, firstly in terms of relations between children and 
adults and secondly in terms of the relations of power such as class, gender or 
ethnicity which cut across childhood.  
 
As discussed above, the norms which govern child-adult relations are linked to 
discursive constructions of childhood which are in turn shaped by wider relations of 
power/knowledge. It is characteristic of modernity that what it is to be human – and 
consequently what is to be a child – is a question which belongs to the domain of 
science. At the heart of the human sciences is the promise of perfectibility associated 
with the malleable subject of humanist thought (Foucault, 1977). As human beings in 
the earliest stages of development children are imbued with particular potential and 
perfectibility is the common thread which links the discourses of childhood 
represented by the Dionysian, Apollonian and Athenian models of childhood. The 
Dionysian child while flawed might be perfected through external intervention, 
whereas the Apollonian child is naturally perfect but needs to be safeguarded from the 
corrupting influences of the adult world. Both of these models underline the 
peculiarity of childhood; in different ways each has underpinned the separation of 
children from adults (at both the conceptual and experiential levels) which we 
associate with modern childhood. In the governmental regimes associated with the 
Athenian child the boundaries between childhood and adulthood have weakened. 
Adults like children are to be governed by modes of ‘conducting conduct’ premised 
on learning, while children like adults are to be governed by modes of ‘conducting 
conduct’ premised on autonomy and participation (Kryger, 2004). Here participation 
serves as a means to perfectibility with ‘flexible souls’ (Fendler, 2001) as the desired 
end products. The Athenian child thus represents a mode of governing childhood in 
which, somewhat ironically, ideas about children’s agency can be deployed in the 
kinds of instrumental, future-oriented strategies that the image of the child as 
‘competent social actor’ was developed to counter.  
 
Discourses of childhood can be deployed in ways which simultaneously obscure and 
reinforce unequal relations of power such as those based on class, race or gender. We 
know from Foucault (1977) that discourses are ‘normalizing’ in that they operate to 
differentiate between the ‘normal’ and the ‘abnormal’. The three discourses of 
childhood discussed in this paper are grounded in assumptions about the nature of 
childhood which construct the normality/abnormality dichotomy in different ways. At 
the same time the shared element of malleability means that these discourses each 
operate within a broader framework of ‘investment’ which positions children as either 
potential assets or potential liabilities from a societal point of view. As is clear from 
the literature, whether viewed through the prism of morality/immorality (the 
Dionysian child), in ‘Apollonian’ terms of adjustment/maladjustment or ‘Athenian’ 
terms of responsibility/irresponsibility children reared in low income families have 
frequently been regarded as inadequately socialized and consequently as potential 
liabilities to be contained. We thus find a high degree of continuity in the manner in 
which responsibility for tackling inequality and disadvantage is rebounded onto 
parents (and more recently children themselves) within diverse strategies for 
governing childhood. 
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whose thoughtful comments have helped to significantly strengthen the paper. 
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